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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990966-CA 
v. : 
RICK PREECE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Appellant/Defendant, Rick Preece, appeals his conviction for violation of a 
protective order, a Class A misdemeanor, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999), in the 
Third Judicial District Court, West Valley Department, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Ann Boy den presiding. A copy of the judgment is included as 
Addendum A. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was sufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain Mr. Preece's conviction 
for violation of a protective order? 
Standard of Review: In considering whether a conviction is supported by sufficient 
evidence, this Court reviews the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict. This Court may reverse a decision 
only when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue of sufficiency of evidence is preserved by the defendant's motion for 
directed verdict. R. 42:23-25. 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are relevant to this matter and are set forth in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101 (1983) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1983) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1974) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Preece was charged with violating a protective order on May 25, 1999, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999), a Class A misdemeanor. Mr. Preece 
exercised his right to a bench trial on August 13, 1999. 
At the trial, defense counsel stipulated that a valid protective order was indeed in 
effect. The alleged victim, Ms. Shosted, testified that on May 25, Mr. Preece pulled his 
car into her driveway. Upon seeing Mr. Preece, Ms. Shosted quickly grabbed her kids, 
went inside her house and locked the door behind her. She then states Mr. Preece 
pounded on the door. In response, Ms. Shosted opened the door and told Mr. Preece to go 
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until he had seen his kids. 
Ms. Shosted admitted Mr. Preece was allowed standard visitation by the protective 
order and read into the record the paragraph from the protective order allowing him 
1
 liiiiiii.ini '" iMilalioii Ms Shush nf aKo Irslilinl llwt pnoi In ll\Ia\ J'\ Mi hea t 1 li.nl nnl 
established a pattern of visitation. 
After the State rested, the defense counsel moved the court for a directed verdict 
on the basis that Mr. Preece did not intentionally or knowingly violate the protective 
order. Defense counsel itiiai^n the paragraph of the protective order allowing Mr. 
Preece standard vi . *' - Hled's udmi-oinn (liiill IMIi 1'icecc iuldl hei In 
would not leave until he had seen his kids. The court denied the motion. 
After the defense presented it's case, including Mr. Preece's testimony, the court 
found Mr. Preece guilty of violating a protective order. The court based if- mV.nv on the 
- that a protective order was in place and that Mr. Preece was at the protected address 
mid liui'i! umliid Willi M • Sitoslall the protected person, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sherry Shosted obtained a protective order against Rick Preece. R, 42; 13, Hie 
order permitted Mr. Preece to exercise "[standard visitation according to Utah Code." R 
42:21. . , 
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On May 25, 1999, Ms. Shosted was outside vacuuming her car when it began to 
rain. R. 42:13. Ms. Shosted took the vacuum inside and returned to the car to lock the 
doors. R. 42:13. As she was locking the doors, she heard a car pull up in her driveway. 
R. 42:13. Ms. Shosted identified the driver of the car as Mr. Preece. R. 42:13. At that 
time, two of Ms. Shosted's children were next door playing while the third child, Rachel, 
was inside the house. R. 42:14. Upon seeing Mr. Preece, Ms. Shosted grabbed her two 
children from next door, went inside the house and locked the door. R. 42:14. 
Ms. Shosted testified that Mr. Preece then began pounding on the door. R. 42:14. 
Ms. Shosted opened the door and told Mr. Preece to leave. R. 42:14. Mr. Preece told Ms. 
Shosted that "he wasn't going to leave until he's seen [sic] the kids." R. 42:14-15. Ms. 
Shosted refused visitation and then called the police. R. 42:15. According to Ms. 
Shosted, Mr. Preece left three to five minutes before the police arrived. R. 42:15. 
Deputy James Wright was dispatched to 7272 West Adams Road on a "report of a 
woman reporting that her ex-husband was pounding on the front door, threatening her." 
R. 42:3. When Deputy Wright arrived, he saw Deputy Palmer was already at the scene 
with Ms. Shosted. R. 42:4. 
Deputy Wright contacted Ms. Shosted and asked her why she had called the 
police. R. 42:4. Ms. Shosted informed him that Mr. Preece "had attempted to enter the 
house." R. 42:5. Ms. Shosted indicated that Mr. Preece had done so by trying to "kick in 
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the front door " R 42:5 Depi it} Wright testified that he did i: lot see ai ly damage to any 
part of the door or house. R. 42:5. 
Deputy Wright searched the area for Mr. Preece for about five to ten minutes but 
did not find Mr. Preece. R. 4 J" ,x /-8. 1 )cpiity "W right never questioned or spoke with any 
nClIu; fhfiv uliiliijiiii.ii nlio w in p i ts i i i ! al Ihr him: ml (lie incnluil IK -I " 9, 
Ms. Shosted admitted that she was convicted of a ci in le c f dishonesty ; in 1996 
because she issued a check to the Flower Patch knowing it would not be paid. R. 42:21-
22. 
A t trial, I\ Is. Shosted testified that there had been no pattern established for Mr. 
Preece to ,( isit his -* ^ • . * 
counsel moved for a directed vci.' • m the has ! * -
Preece had violated the protective order because the plain language of the protective order 
allowed Mr. Preece standard visitation rights. R, 42:23-24. Defense counsel argued that 
since JVli ; i cece was allowed standard visitation w ith his child by the protective order 
his child, the protective order was not violated. R. 42:23-24. 
The court denied defense counsePs motion, concluding that although Mr. Preece 
had informed Ms. Shosted that he was not leaving until he saw the children, absent a 
pattern ol visitation, (lie slate had presented u pinna iacia case that a protective order 
", m i l l i o n t 'otihl \w < m " MM v\i H 1 } ^4- ^ • ' • ' . . • 
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Defense counsel called Mr. Preece to testify. Mr. Preece testified that he had 
attempted to exercise visitation numerous times but Ms. Shosted had denied all of his 
visitation attempts. R. 42:26-27. Mr. Preece admitted that it is possible that he was at Ms. 
Shosted's house on May 25, and that if he had been there, it was to exercise visitation. R. 
42:27. 
Mr. Preece testified that he had visitation rights for one night per week and on 
weekends. He further testified that if he went to Ms. Shosted's home on May 25, he 
would have called her the Sunday before to tell her he would be exercising visitation on 
Tuesday, May 25. R. 42:27. Mr. Preece denied going to Ms. Shosted's home for any 
purpose other than visitation. R. 42:28. He also testified that he had gone to Ms. 
Shosted's house a number of times in the past and had similarly been denied visitation 
with his daughter. R. 42:28. Mr. Preece denied he kicked Ms. Shosted's door. R. 42:28. 
Mr. Preece testified that he had telephoned Ms. Shosted on a number of occasions 
to set up visitation but had been unable to do so because M[s]he won't answer her phone. 
She's got an answering machine, when she hears somebody, she'll answer, that she 
knows. Obviously she won't answer to me. So I've tried. You know, I've tried." R. 
42:29. 
Following Mr. Preece's testimony, the prosecutor argued that because Mr. Preece 
had not set up a visitation schedule and his visit to Ms. Shosted's home was unexpected, 
the court should find that Mr. Preece had violated the protective order. R. 42:30-31. 
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Defense UUMISLI aimied iliml llie proirdiu' on In pennillnl Mr. Preece to exercise 
^ isitation and that Mr. Preece told Ms. Shosted he was there to see his child; 
consequently, his presence did not constitute a violation of the protective order. 
Defense counsel pointed out that there was no damage to the door, no neighbors 
called to complain, and the children appareetl)' did it lot se e any thing 01 at least were t lot 
questioned. K. 41 "}? hn.ill defense counsel emphasized that Ms. Shosted has a 
i( li.-i ii inn tor a crime involving dishonesty and harbors a great deal of anger and bad 
feelings for Mr. Preece. R 4; 1 These factors provide the motive for 1\Is. Shosted to 
testify less than truthfully and to call the police when she did not want Mi Preece to ha \ ; e 
visitation with his chn, 
I; o 11 o \ v i 11 L > I < ' s -ii 11 (< nn 111 1\ 1 r Preece guilty of violating the 
protective order. Specifically, the court concluded as follows: 
The only issue, legally, is whether or not the paragraph that Ms. Shosted 
read into the record since it was simply a stipulation, that the protective 
order is in place and the protective order was never placed on the record or 
into evidence, simply the paragraph that Miss Shosted read that said Mr. 
Preece is entitled to the visitation as allowed by Code. I'm very familiar 
with that statute, I'm very familiar with the protective order paragraph that 
uses that as standard language. Clearly it is a presumption that will be 
standardized visitation and that standardized visitation is according to age 
and according to schedule, oftentimes according to supervision. All of that 
is set out by the Court. It is not something that one party or the other just 
determines on his own that he is just going to go to the house and work this 
out outside of a locked door. 
If Mr. Preece is having a difficult time getting statutory \ t^iau^*... 
remedy is to go to the courts and get it set up He is entitled to strum. -
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visitation. The protective order carries no form whatsoever and no 
protection whatsoever if the fact that he is entitled to visit a young child 
under the age of five on the weekends and on the evening and there is no 
scheduled visitation set up, allows him to just go to a protected location 
anytime without notice, even if it is his intended reason. Then the 
protective order carries no protection at all and that is, I simply find that 
that is not the basis of the paragraph that says Mr. Preece is allowed 
statutory visitation. That was read in the paragraph. 
That statutory visitation is to be set up by the court and to be done through a 
schedule according to the code which is very strict and involves a great deal 
of court intervention. It is not to be handled on a violation of protective 
order. It is not this judge's prerogative or this Court's role to set up that 
visitation schedule. It is simply to determine if a protective order was in 
place. That has been stipulated to. And based upon the testimony of Ms. 
Shosted, that was violated because Mr. Preece appeared at that particular 
location and had contact with Ms. Shosted. 
Therefore I'm finding you guilty of the violation of a protective order, a 
Class A misdemeanor, because of a stipulation to the protective order. 
R. 42:35-37. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
demonstrate that Mr. Preece intentionally or knowingly violated the protective order by 
attempting to exercise his right to standard visitation with his child. 
ARGUMENT 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS MR. PREECE'S CONVICTION FOR 
VIOLATION OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER. 
A finding that a valid protective order was in place and that Mr. Preece was 
present at a protected address and had contact with the protected person is insufficient to 
8 
find him in violation of a protective order where the protective order specifically entitles 
Mr. Preece standard visitation.1 Ms. Shosted, the alleged victim, testified that the first 
conversation between she and Mr. Preece was that she told him to leave and Mr. Preece 
responded that he was not going to leave until he had seen his kids. R. 42:14-15. 
Mr. Preece was charged with violating a protective order pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-108. This section provides that a person, "who intentionally or knowingly 
violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty of a Class A 
misdemeanor." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999) (emphasis added). However, "no 
person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and: (1) [h]e acts 
intentionally, knowingly . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101 (1983). Additionally, the next 
code section states, "Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable 
mental state." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1983) (emphasis added). 
1
 The State marshaled the following evidence against Mr. Preece during the bench 
trial: 
(1) That a protective order was in place, at least on the day of the trial. R. 
42:13. 
(2) The person that the protective order was to be served upon was "Rick." R. 
42:11-12. 
(3) That on May 25, 1999 Mr. Preece was present at Ms. Shosted's residence 
located at 7272 West Adams Rd. R. 42:11, 13-14. 
(4) That Mr. Preece pounded and kicked her door. R. 42:15. 
(5) Following the pounding on the door, a conversation took place between Ms. 
Shosted and Mr. Preece. R. 42:14-15, 16. 
(6) The protective order allowed standard visitation to Mr. Preece and that he 
had not established a pattern of visitation. R. 42:20-22. 
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The mens rea of intentional is defined as, "[i Intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is 
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (1974). Knowingly is defined as, "[kjnowingly, or with knowledge, 
with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware 
of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct 
is reasonably certain to cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2). 
The Utah Supreme Court stated, "before we can uphold a conviction it must be 
supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged 
from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Spanish Fork Citv v. Brvan. 975 P.2d 501, 502 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting State v. 
Murphv. 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980)) (emphasis added). 
The question at issue in this case is not whether there was a valid protective order 
in place or even whether Mr. Preece was present at the protected address and had contact 
with the protected person.2 The issue is whether Mr. Preece was attempting to exercise his 
visitation rights as allowed by the protective order. If Mr. Preece was attempting to 
2
 Although, the stipulation was, "there is a protective order in place." R. 42:13. 
From the record this only seems to stipulate that a protective order was in place on the 
day of trial, not whether a protective order was in place on May 25, 1999 when the 
alleged violation took place. No other evidence that a protective order was in effect on 
May 25 was ever introduced. 
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exercise his visitation rights, then he clearly could not be found to have intentionally or 
knowingly violated a valid protective order. 
On this issue, during the trial Ms. Shosted testified that when she asked Mr. Preece 
to leave he told her that, "he wasn't going to leave until he's seen [sic] the kids." R. 14-
15. In fact, this was apparently the first communication between the two according to the 
record. R. 42:13-15. Additionally, Mr. Preece testified that although he did not have a 
specific recollection of the day the alleged violation occurred, he admitted it was entirely 
likely that he was in fact at Ms. Shosted's house on the date in question. R. 42:27. Mr. 
Preece also stated that if he was present at Ms. Shosted's house it was to visit his daughter 
and that it was his practice to call the Sunday prior to his visitation in order to put Ms. 
Shosted on notice that he intended to exercise visitation on a particular day and time. 
R.42:27, 29-30. 
Mr. Preece testified that generally when he called Ms. Shosted she would not 
answer the phone and he would leave a message on an answering machine so she would 
know what day and time he was coming to visit his daughter. R. 42:27. 
The testimony of both Ms. Shosted and Mr. Preece seem to be in agreement that 
Mr. Preece wanted to visit his daughter. R. 42:14-15, 27-28. 
In its findings of fact the trial court did not make a ruling on whether Mr. Preece 
was exercising visitation or not. The court stated, 
11 
That statutory visitation is to be set up by the courts and to be done through 
a schedule according to the code which is very strict and involves a great 
deal of court intervention. It is not to be handled on a violation of a 
protective order. It is not this judge's prerogative or this Court's role to 
set up that visitation schedule. It is simply to determine if a protective 
order was in place. That has been stipulated to. And based upon the 
testimony of Ms. Shosted, that was violated because Mr. Preece 
appeared at that particular location and had contact with Ms. Shosted. 
Therefore, I'm finding you guilty of the violation of protective order, a class 
A misdemeanor, because of a stipulation to the protective order. 
R. 42:36-37 (emphasis added). 
The court based its ruling simply on the fact that a valid protective order was in 
place and that Mr. Preece was in fact at the protected address and had contact with Ms. 
Shosted, the protected person. R. 42:36-37.The court made absolutely no finding that Mr. 
Preece knowingly or intentionally violated that order. 
If Mr. Preece was in fact attempting to exercise visitation with his daughter, it is 
clear that he was pursuing what he believed to be a proper activity allowed by the 
protective order. This fact negates the necessary mental state that would require Mr. 
Preece's conscious objective was to violate the protective order or that he was aware that 
his conduct would reasonably result in the violation of a protective order. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-103. 
In this case, just as in Petree, even if Mr. Preece was technically in violation of the 
letter of the protective order, the evidence is, "manifestly insufficient to prove the he did 
12 
so intentionally or knowingly'." 659 P.2d at 447. No evidence was presented to the court 
to establish that Mr. Preece was present for any reason other than to visit his daughter. 
As a result, in Mr. Preece's mind he was in compliance with the protective order. 
Therefore, a sufficient quantum of evidence of the requisite mental state element of this 
crime has not been established. Bryan, 975 P.2d at 502. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the reasons stated above, the judgement of conviction should be 
reversed. 
SUBMITTED this SU day of April, 2000. 
JAREDW.1ELDRIDGE 
Attorney forv Appellant/Defendant 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JARED W. ELDRIDGE, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered the 
original and seven of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th 
Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-0230, and two copies of the 
foregoing to the District Attorney's Office, 2001 South State Street #S3700, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84190-1210, this S"U day of April, 2000. 
Delivered this day of April, 2000. 
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ADDENDUM B: 
Text of relevant statutes 
UT ST § 76-2-101, Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal Page 1 
responsibility-
Utah Code § 76-2-101 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PART 1. CULPABILITY 
GENERALLY 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1999 General Sess. 
§ 76-2-101. Requirements of criminal 
conduct and criminal responsibility 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his 
conduct is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with a 
mental state otherwise specified in the statute 
defining the offense, as the definition of the 
offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving 
strict liability. 
These standards of criminal responsibility 
shall not apply to the violations set forth in Title 
41, Chapter 6, unless specifically provided by 
law. 
As last amended by Chapters 90 and 98, Laws of Utah 
1983 
WESTS UTAH CODE 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PART 1. CULPABILITY GENERALLY 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
UT ST § 76-2-102, Culpable mental state required--Strict liability Page 1 
Utah Code § 76-2-102 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PART 1. CULPABILITY 
GENERALLY 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1999 General Sess. 
§ 76-2-102. Culpable mental state 
required—Strict liability 
Every offense not involving strict liability 
shall require a culpable mental state, and when 
the definition of the offense does not specify a 
culpable mental state and the offense does not 
involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility. An offense shall involve strict 
liability if the statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose 
criminal responsibility for commission of the 
conduct prohibited by the statute without 
requiring proof of any culpable mental state. 
As last amended by Chapter 90, Laws of Utah 1983. 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PART 1. CULPABILITY GENERALLY 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
UT ST § 76-2-103, Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PART 1. CULPABILITY 
GENERALLY 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1999 General Sess. 
§ 76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, 
or with intent or willfully11; 
"knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and 
"criminal negligence or criminally 
negligent 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully 
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the 
nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of his 
conduct when he is aware that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally 
negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The 
risk must be of such a nature and degree that the 
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
As last amended by Chapter 32, Laws of Utah 1974. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES AGAINST 
THE PERSON 
PART 1. ASSAULT AND RELATED 
OFFENSES 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1999 General Sess. 
§ 76-5-108. Protective orders restraining 
abuse of another—Violations 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or 
defendant subject to a protective order or ex 
parte protective order issued under Title 30, 
Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, 
Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 
77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures 
Act, or a foreign protective order as described in 
Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or 
knowingly violates that order after having been 
properly sewed, is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may 
be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant 
Abuse Procedures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in 
Subsection (1) is a domestic violence offense 
under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased 
penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1. 
Amended by Laws 1993, c 137, Laws 1995, c 300, § 15, 
eff July 1, 1995, Laws 1996, c 244, § 9, eff April 29, 
1996, Laws 1999, c 246, § 1, eff May 3, 1999 
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Current through End of 1999 General Sess. 
§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
the agencies, except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, 
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for 
extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal 
sentence, except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for 
extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of 
the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving 
domestic relations cases, including, but not 
limited to, divorce, annulment, property 
division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
*27162 (i) appeals from the Utah Military 
Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion 
only and by the vote of four judges of the court 
may certify to the Supreme Court for original 
appellate review and determination any matter 
over which the Court of Appeals has original 
appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with 
the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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